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ABSTRACT
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND MARKETS
SEPTEMBER 2009
LINUS M. NYIWUL, B.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF BUEA
M.A., AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor John Stranlund

This dissertation consists of two theoretical papers on market-based
environmental policy. The first paper exploits the correlation between the environmental
performance of firms and their economic performance to show that financial markets can
be used to help enforce environmental policy and to design more efficient regulations.
The results indicate that when markets punish firms for not complying with
environmental standards, environmental regulators can exploit this by setting stricter
standards. In fact, it is possible for the regulator to use market-driven enforcement to
reduce a firm’s emissions and monitoring of the firm simultaneously. The second paper
provides a theoretical analysis of the nature of an optimal emissions tax when firms’
emissions are not perfectly observable. The purpose is to examine how the optimal tax is
affected by enforcement costs and the market structure. We obtain the result that market
imperfections and enforcement costs push the optimal tax lower than the marginal
damage when the number of firms in the market is exogenous. However, when the
number of firms is determined endogenously enforcement costs generate two
countervailing effects on the optimal tax. The overall effect of enforcement costs on the
optimal tax depends on the strength of direct relative to indirect effects when there is free
entry and exit.
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CHAPTER 1
EXPLOITING FINANCIAL MARKETS TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY
1.1 Introduction
Analytical and empirical studies have identified a correlation between the
environmental performance of firms and their economic performance. Good environmental
performance in these studies refers to consistent compliance or over-compliance with
environmental standards and/or the adoption of effective voluntary programs. Measures of
economic performance vary from profit to stock market measures. Positive or negative effects
of environmental performance on economic performance suggest that markets can be exploited
to help enforce environmental policies and to design more efficient regulations. In this paper
we examine environmental standard setting with both regulatory and market-driven
enforcement. A unique feature of the model is that we consider a conventional emissions
standard for a firm combined with a stricter standard with which the regulator certifies that the
firm is over-compliant. We demonstrate how regulators may be able to exploit market penalties
and rewards for environmental performance to pursue more stringent environmental
regulations.
Empirical studies that attempt to link financial performance to environmental
performance have focused in large part on correlation and regression analysis (for example,
Mamingi et al., 2006; Al-Tuwaijri et al, 2004). There also has been emphasis on event studies,
which emphasizes the impact on a firm’s financial measure before and after incidents of
violations or recognition for good environmental performance (for example, Hamilton, 1995;

1
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Klassen & McLaughlin, 1996; Laplante et al, 1994; Bosch et al, 1998). There is evidence that
announcements or disclosure of violations result in negative security price movements across
all industries (Shane, Spicer & Barry, 1983; Konar and Cohen, 1997, 2001; Gupta and Goldar,
2005; Dasgupta et al, 2001; 2006). The difference in the intensity of movements in firm value
reflects investors’ anticipation of the subsequent effects on the costs of abatement (Ditz, 2002;
Laplante & Lanoie, 1994; Patten and Nance, 1998). Moreover, there is evidence that firms
exposed to large negative effects of violations subsequently reduce their emissions more than
their industry peers (Konar and Cohen, 1997).
Violations often result in lawsuits, whose settlement and/or subsequent investments in
abatement invoke a negative reaction from investors (Muoghalu, 1990; Badrinath & Bolster,
1996). Violations, as well as lawsuits often lead to penalties, and like lawsuits, regulatory
penalties have been shown to cause a fall in a firm’s value (Hughes, 2000). Even challenging
the lawsuits or contesting regulatory penalties further erodes the value of a firm (Bosch et al,
1998).
On the other hand, good environmental performance positively correlates with firm
value (Al-Tuwaijri et al, 2004; Russo et al, 1997; Gupta and Goldar, 2005; Khanna and Anton,
2002; Salama, 2005; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Hamilton, 1995; Feldman et al, 1996), as
does good environmental record keeping; for example, extensive disclosures of the
environmental impact of a firm’s activities (Blacconiere et al, 1994). A good record of

1

An event-study assesses the impact of new information on stock prices by measuring the
changes in the average of the stock prices when such information (event) is made public
(McWilliams et al, 1999). It uses the ‘efficient capital market’ model, which assumes that
security prices are likely to reflect all the available information about the future profit of a
given firm. Event-studies aim to isolate any abnormal stock returns associated with the release
of a specific piece of information.
2

environmental performance reduces financial risks to firms (Halkos and Sepetis, 2007) and
attracts investors seeking “greener’ investments (Barnea et al, 2005).

2

A firm’s environmental performance also has implications for its performance in
product markets. It has been shown that the demand for goods is negatively affected by
noncompliance (Stafford, 2007).

High polluting industries, especially those with greater

consumer contact, often tend to have higher participation rates in voluntary programs (Arora
and Cason, 1996).
The ability of firms to exploit gains in emissions abatement for economic and financial
advantage offers environmental regulators a unique opportunity to enhance and complement
existing regulations to increase their effectiveness. Firms with the potential to achieve higher
abatement levels can be targeted with regulatory and market-oriented incentives. A program
with this characteristic is the National Environmental Performance Track (NEPT), which is an
exclusive club of over-compliant firms aimed at promoting their abatement achievements with
the assistance of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). Over-compliance data for this
program is being used by financial advisory and investment firms. Another approach to
promote ‘green’ investments has been the introduction of stock market indices that focus on

2

Other efforts to establish a market value for environmental performance have focused on
measuring a firm’s performance and exposure through a set of performance indicators and
checklists (Repetto & Austin, 2000). However, such checklists provide no informative link
between a firm’s environmental performance and its market value. A related approach uses
these performance indicators to produce a ratings system, and firms are ranked according to
some index or category. For example, financial advisory and investment firms such as Trucost,
Innovest, Calvert, KLD, etc help companies and investors measure the environmental impacts
of business activities in quantitative and financial terms using performance ratings.

3

the use of abatement technologies. For example, WilderHill Energy Index tracks the clean
3

energy sector.

In this paper, we focus on the implications of the link between environmental and
financial performance. The positive relationship between financial and environmental
performance identified in empirical work suggests that firms that over-comply with
environmental standards are rewarded in financial markets while noncompliant firms are
punished by these markets. We demonstrate how market-driven enforcement complements and
contributes to the objectives of conventional environmental regulation. The role of monitoring
and enforcement on compliance with conventional standards is well documented (for example
see Shimshack & Ward, 2008; Stranlund et al, 2009). But there is no work that addresses
whether market-driven enforcement can be exploited in the design of environmental
regulations. We show that the regulator can combine conventional regulatory enforcement,
financial market forces, and certification for over-compliance to achieve better environmental
performance.
Our results show that market enforcement can be exploited to set stricter emissions
standards. In particular certifying the achievement of over-compliance can lead to improved
environmental quality. Furthermore, market enforcement allows the regulator to reduce
monitoring effort while simultaneously setting a stricter single emissions standard. Setting two
emissions standards - over-compliance and regular standards - is a more efficient policy option
than a single emissions standard, and it results in better environmental quality. However,
setting two emissions standards may require an increase in monitoring effort.

3

See http://www.wildershares.com/
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1.2 The Analytical Framework: Emissions Standards and Compliance
Throughout the analysis we focus on environmental standard setting and enforcement
for a single risk neutral firm. Suppose the market value of the firm, given a level of emissions
e, is w(e) , which is strictly concave. Let e n denote the firm’s emissions level when it does not

control its emissions; that is, e n is the solution to w / (e)  0 - the level of emissions which
maximizes the firm’s per share value. Note that w / (e)  0 for e  e n . The firm’s emissions
produce environmental damage d (e) , which is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
For simplicity the payoff and damage functions are assumed to be quadratic functions.
Thus, their marginals have the following linear forms:
w / (e)  w  w // e
d / (e)  d  d // e

(1)

where w, d , w // , and d // are all positive constants. We assume throughout that w  d , so that it
will never be optimal to completely eliminate the firm’s emissions. In this section the firm
faces a single emissions standard s which forbids emissions above that level. The firm is
compliant if e  s , but it is noncompliant if e  s . To counteract the firm’s incentive to not
comply with the standard the government monitors and enforces the emissions standard.
Monitoring may involve onsite inspections and evaluating self- reporting by the firm of its
abatement activities.
Enforcement here means that a violation of the standard is punished with a fixed fine.
The government monitors the firm with a probability   (0 ,1] . There are no errors in
monitoring, That is, there are no type 1 or type 2 errors. The firm pays a government-mandated
fine,  p , when it is caught cheating. A fixed government-mandated penalty for violation is
suitable for our model for a couple of reasons. First, it avoids uncertainty for the firm when it
5

makes compliance decisions so that the firm has perfect information about the benefits and
costs of compliance and noncompliance. Secondly, penalties (and/or the guidelines on how
they can be imposed) are usually set out in advance in the form of legislation or order. Changes
to such legislation within a reasonable time may be difficult. Also, applying penalties
indiscriminately may expose the regulator to costly litigation.
In addition, the stock market punishes the firm for noncompliance through divestment
by investors. This leads to a loss, m , in the market value of its assets. We refer to this as
4

market enforcement of the standard. The market relies on government monitoring for signals
about the firm’s compliance status. Thus the market penalty is applied only when the
government discovers that the firm has violated the standard. Furthermore, we assume that the
effects of the government-mandated penalty and market punishment are separable.
The government incurs monitoring costs of,  , where  is constant marginal
monitoring costs. There are no costs of penalizing the firm if it is caught in violation.

5

Because the government and market penalties are fixed values that do not depend on
the firm’s choice of emissions, the firm’s compliance decision is binary. The firm either
complies with the standard by choosing e  s or it violates the standard by not reducing its
emissions, that is, by choosing e  en . We make the common assumption that the firm will
comply with the standard if it is indifferent between compliance and noncompliance.
Therefore, the firm is compliant if and only if its payoff from complying with the standard is

4

This could also be a loss in value because some consumers leave the firm.
Cohen (1986) in a study of the prevention of oil pollution in US coastal waters estimated that
the marginal cost of preventing one gallon of oil to be $5.50. Of this amount, only $3.98 is the
cost to the industry associated with additional prevention effort. The remaining $1.52 is the
enforcement cost associated with the US Coast guard having to operate more frequent patrols.

5

6

not

less

than

its

expected

payoff

when

it

violates

the

standard;

that

is,

w( s )  w(e n )   ( p  m ) . Alternatively, the firm complies if and only if
w(e n )  w( s )   ( p  m ) .

(2)

The interpretation of equation (2) is that the firm complies if and only if the gain from
noncompliance, w(e n )  w( s ) , is not greater than the expected penalty for noncompliance,

 ( p  m ) .
Throughout we assume that it is efficient from society’s point of view that the firm
reduce its emissions below e n . Given the all-or-nothing nature of the firm’s compliance
decision, this implies that the government chooses  and s so that the firm is compliant.
Moreover, to economize on monitoring costs the government chooses  and s so that (2)
holds with equality. This implicitly defines the amount of monitoring necessary to motivate the
firm to comply with some standard s, given the penalties m and  p ; that is,

 ( s) 

w(e n )  w( s )
.
 p  m

(3)

Obviously we have to have  ( s )  [0 , 1] .  ( s )  0 is guaranteed by w(e n )  w( s ) . Moreover,
if

[ w(e n )  w( s )] /[ p  m ]  1 , then the firm violates the standard even if   1 . This

outcome would violate our assumption that it will be efficient to reduce the firm’s emissions.
This implies that if [ w(e n )  w( s )] /[ p  m ]  1 for some s, the government needs to reduce
the standard so that [ w(e n )  w( s )] /[ p  m ]  1 .
Using (3) note that

 / ( s)  

w / ( s)
0,
 p  m

(4)

7

which indicates that the monitoring necessary to achieve compliance is monotonically
decreasing in the emissions standard. This is intuitive because a stricter standard increases the
firm’s motivation to cheat, which increases the monitoring required to ensure compliance with
the standard.
To determine the optimal emissions standard for the firm the regulator maximizes the
difference between the firm’s payoff and damages and monitoring costs, subject to e  s and
(3). Thus, the regulator’s problem can be expressed as

max w( s )  d ( s )   ( s ) .
s

(5)

Using (4) the first order condition for an interior choice of s can be written as

d / ( s)  w / ( s) 

w/ (s)
0.
 p  m

(6)

Denote the solution to (6) as sr . Using the linear forms of d / and w / from (1) and (6) we can
solve for sr explicitly:

sr 


Aw  d
A 1 
.
//
// , where
 p  m
Aw  d

(7)

From here on we refer to sr as the regular standard. The first-best emissions standard —
the standard that equates w / ( s ) and d / ( s) — can be determined from (7) by setting marginal
monitoring costs  equal to zero. The first best- standard is s1 in Figure 1. For   0 , it is
straightforward to show that sr is increasing in  . This reflects the well-known fact that it is
optimal to set a less strict standard when the marginal cost of enforcing compliance with the
standard is greater.
It is also straightforward to show that sr is decreasing in the regulatory and market
penalties for noncompliance. Hence, when markets punish firms for not complying with
8

environmental standards, environmental regulators can exploit this by setting stricter standards.
Our regular standard sr and the optimal standard in the absence of market penalties, s2 , are
graphed in Figure 1 with the use of equation (6).
The final task of this section is to determine if market enforcement of environmental
standards allows a regulator to reduce its enforcement effort. There are two countervailing
effects at work in the answer to this question. First, holding a standard constant, an additional
market penalty for noncompliance allows the regulator to reduce the amount of monitoring it
must expend to keep the firm compliant. However, a market penalty implies that the optimal
emissions standard should be stricter, which will tend to increase the monitoring requirement.
To determine which effect dominates, using (3), monitoring at standards sr , sr and s2 are

 ( sr ) 

w(e n )  w( sr )
w(e n )  w( s2 )
and  ( s2 ) 
respectively. Substitute the quadratic forms
 p  m
p

of the linear equations for d / and w / from (1) into  ( sr ) and  ( s2 ) to obtain

 ( sr )   ( s2 ) 

( wd //  w // d ) 2 m [( w //  ) 2  (d //  w // ) 2  p (m   p )]



2 w // d // p  w // ( p   ) 2 [d // ( p  m )  w // ( p  m   )]2

.

Note that  ( sr )   ( s2 ) in the absence of market enforcement; that is, when m  0 . However,
when m  0 , sign[ ( s r )   ( s 2 )]  sign[( w //  ) 2  (d //  w // ) 2  p ( m   p )]. This relationship
suggests that it may be possible to use market-driven enforcement to reduce a firm’s emissions
and monitoring of the firm simultaneously. The latter is more likely when marginal monitoring
costs are relatively small and/or regulatory and market penalties are relatively large.

9

d / ( e)

$

/

w ( e)

s1

so

sr

w / ( so )
 g   p  m

w / ( sr )
 p  m

Emissions

Figure 1: An Optimal Emissions Standard with Market-Driven Enforcement

1.3 Market-Driven Enforcement Allows the Setting of an Over-compliance Standard

We have established that the regulator can exploit market punishment of environmental
violations to set stricter emissions standards. In this section, we show how it might be possible
for a regulator to set an even stricter standard by which it certifies that a firm is overcompliant. Over-compliance refers to environmental performance beyond the requirements of
a regular emissions standard. Over-compliance is optional for the firm, but the firm may find it
worthwhile if financial markets reward this choice.
It is worth noting that several other reasons for firms’ over-compliance, especially with
voluntary programs, have been advanced in a different context in the literature. These reasons
include pressure to appeal to “green” consumers (Stafford, 2007; Videras & Alberini, 2000;
Arora & Cason,1996), to pre-empt regulation, to seek relief from the regulatory authority, and
to gain an advantage over competitors (Videras & Alberini, 2000). However, it can be
successfully argued that all these reasons for firm’s over-compliance also boosts the firm’s

10

valuation and hence its share price. So the results of this paper may have applications in these
other settings as well.
Suppose the firm now faces two standards, a regular standard sr and an overcompliance standard so , with 0  so  sr . Note that the regular standard here does not have an
overbar as in the last section. We remove it when denoting the regular standard when there is
also an over-compliance standard. Suppose that if the firm reduces its emissions to the overcompliance standard and is audited by the regulator that the regulator makes the firm’s overcompliance public through some sort of certification. Upon learning of this certification
investors incorporate this information into their decisions. Financial advisory firms commonly
employ such information in their business risk analysis. Suppose further that the financial
markets reward the firm with an increase in the market value of  g when it is revealed that the
firm has reached the over-compliance standard. Note that the firm’s expected payoff from
reaching the over-compliance standard is w( so )  g .
An example of a program that promotes over-compliance is the EPA’s National
Environmental Performance Track (NEPT), which is an exclusive club of over-compliant
firms. Since this program motivates the forthcoming analysis, it is worth describing NEPT. We
then proceed to lay out what we believe would be an effective approach for the program.
In its basic form, NEPT simply groups facilities that have demonstrated consistent
compliance with existing regulations, voluntarily implemented programs (for example
Environmental Management Systems (EMS)) to increase abatement, and can make verifiable
commitments to improve on that performance.

Facilities make independent choices for

abatement objectives and self report achievements within a certain time period. The program
is promoted through the use of administrative and market-oriented incentives. For example,

11

members are afforded administrative incentives such as low priority for inspection targeting
purposes and discretion in assessing penalties for violations. Market-oriented incentives
include the use of the NEPT logo for marketing purposes, awards for best performers and the
use of over-compliance data by financial advisory and investment firms such as Innovest,
Trucost, Calvert and KLD in their evaluation of the business risks associated with the
6

environmental costs of pollution related activities. Membership in the program therefore
indicates low risk of a violation compared to non-members.
A potential weakness of the program is that over-compliance is relative; it is not a
unique predetermined target to be achieved by a firm. In the case of a specific pollutant it is
just a measure of how far the firm’s emissions are below the emissions standard. Because overcompliance is not a unique target to be achieved there is little incentive for a firm to increase
its emissions standard/over-compliance gap. In other words, a firm may simply strive for
minimum over-compliance performance to enjoy the administrative and market-oriented
benefits.
Suppose instead that over-compliance is achieved by attaining a certain overcompliance standard below the regular standard. Just like in the case of the regular standard,
this over-compliance standard is monitored and enforced. A firm that achieves this overcompliance standard receives a certification for its achievement from the regulator. We wish to
determine whether the regulator can set an over-compliance standard that the firm will find
optimal to achieve. Suppose the regulator has set a regular standard that the firm would comply
with. This requires that the regulator monitors the firm so that the detection probability is
6

National Environmental Performance Track (NEPT),
http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/benefits/investing.htm.
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 2000. “Green Dividends? The Relationship Between
Firms’ Environmental Performance and Financial Performance”, Washington D.C.
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 ( sr ) defined by (3). Given  ( sr ) , the firm will comply with an over-compliance standard if
and only if

w( so )   ( sr ) g  w( sr )  0

(8)

Since w( s ) is increasing in s, there exist s o  s r such that (8) holds as long as  g  0. This is
an important result that suggests that if a firm will comply with a regular standard, there is a
stricter over-compliance standard that it will be motivated to achieve without the need for
additional enforcement pressure. Simply setting the standard and certifying that the firm has
met it improves environmental performance without additional public resources.

1.4 Optimal Over-Compliance

Of course, the regular standard, the over-compliance standard, and monitoring to support
compliance with both should all be chosen optimally. That is the task of this section. To begin,
note from (8) that given sr and  ( sr ) , the strictest over-compliance standard the firm will
comply with is determined by

w( s o )   ( s r ) g  w( s r )  0 .

(9)

Under the assumption that the regulator would like to guarantee that the firm will reduce its
emissions to the over-compliance standard, we impose (8) on the design of the optimal policy.
Note that choosing sr gives us so through equation (9) and  ( sr ) through equation (3). Thus,
all the elements of the optimal policy follow from choosing the optimal regular standard sr.
Proceeding accordingly, (8) implicitly defines the over-compliance standard as a
function of the regular standard, so ( sr ) . Then the optimal policy is found by first choosing sr to
maximize

13

w( so ( sr ))  d ( so ( sr ))   ( sr ) .

(10)

The first-order condition is
[ w / ( so )  d / ( so )]so/ ( sr )   / ( sr )  0 .

(11)

The optimal values of so , sr , and  are the simultaneous solutions to (10), (8), and (3).
Toward characterizing the optimal policy to induce over-compliance, first use (8) to
obtain s ( sr )  
/
o

w / ( sr )   / ( sr )g
w / ( so )

. From (4),  / ( sr )   w/ ( sr ) /( p  m ) . Substituting this

into so/ ( sr ) yields
so/ ( sr ) 

w / ( sr )   g   p  m 

  0.
w/ ( so )   p  m 

(12)

The sign of (12) simply indicates that the over-compliance standard is lower as the regular
standard is lower. Substitute (12) and  / ( sr )   w/ ( sr ) /( p  m ) into the first order condition
(11) and rearrange the result to obtain



/
w / ( so ) 1 
  d ( so )  0 .
 g   p  m 

(13)

Using the linear forms of w / ( so ) and d / ( so ) from (1), solving (13) yields the optimal overcompliance emissions standard

so 

Bw  d

, where B  1 
.
//
//
Bw  d
 g   p  m

(14)

Compare (14) to (7) and note that the optimal over-compliance standard has the same
basic structure as sr , the regular standard when the regulator does not also set an overcompliance standard. Since the firm complies with so when the regulator sets it as the over-

14

compliance standard, but it complies with sr when the regulator does not set the overcompliance standard, comparing the two tells us whether the firm chooses lower emissions
when faced with so .

Note that so differs from sr only by the inclusion of  g . It is

straightforward to show that so is strictly decreasing in  g . Since so  sr for  g  0 , so  sr
for  g  0 . This is graphed in Figure 2. Thus, the optimal environmental performance of the
firms is improved when a regulator can exploit financial market rewards by setting and
certifying compliance with an over-compliance standard.

d / ( e)

$

w / ( so )
 g   p  m

w / ( sr )
 p  m
w / ( e)
s1

so

sr

Emissions

Figure 2: An Optimal Over-Compliance Standard

1.5 Effects of Setting Two Emissions Standards on Monitoring Probability and the
Regular Standard

We have argued that setting two standards is good policy. In the case of only the
regular standard, it is possible to reduce monitoring if market penalties are large relative to the
marginal monitoring costs. However, an over-compliance standard is a stricter standard, which
may require increased monitoring. In this section we determine whether setting two emissions
standards; an over-compliance standard and a regular standard may result in lower or higher

15

overall standard. The conclusion here will be a guide to understanding whether the monitoring
probability will increase or decrease under the two-standards scenario.
First, recall that we have derived an optimal over-compliance emissions standard in (8)
for a regulator setting two standards. To obtain a regular emissions standard in this context,
which is now a function of the over-compliance standard, we consider the quadratic forms of
the linear equations set out in (1) for emissions. The quadratic equations for payoffs from the
various compliance choices – noncompliance, compliance and over-compliance – can be
written as: w(e n )  w  we 

w // 2
w // 2
w // 2
e , w( sr )  w  wsr 
sr , w( so )  w  wso 
so . The
2
2
2

maximum level of emissions possible for the firm can be expressed as e  w / w // , where

w / w // is the solution to w / (e)  0 . Substitute e  w / w // and the quadratic forms for w( sr ) ,
w( so ) into equation (8) to obtain

 p  m   g
w 2 g
w //  p  m   g 2
w // 2
(
) sr  w(
) sr  wso 
 0.
so 
2
2
2 w // ( p  m )
 p  m
 p  m

(15)

The equality in (15) assumes that the government chooses so , sr and monitoring probability to
minimize monitoring costs.
Furthermore, equation (14) can be re-written as

so 

w( p  m   g   )  ( p  m   g )d
w // ( p  m   g   )  ( p  m   g )d //

.

Substituting so into equation (15) and solving for sr yields
1
2

1
2

//
//
w ( p  m ) ( p  m   g ) (d w  dw )
.
sr  // 
w
w // [( p  m   g )(d //  w // )  w //  ]
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(16)

We can now compare the regular standard obtained from setting a single emissions
__

standard, s r (represented by equation 7) and the minimum emissions standard that results
__

from setting two emissions standards ( sr from equation (16)). s r is the single emissions
standard that obtains under government and market punishment while sr is the minimum
regular standard resulting from two emissions standards under combined government
__

enforcement and market rewards. The difference between s r and sr can be expressed as:
1

[ sr  s r ] 

1

( p  m ) 2 ( p  m   g ) 2 (d // w  dw // )

w( p  m   )  ( p  m )d
w


.
w //
w // [( p  m   g )(d //  w // )  w //  ]
w // ( p  m   )  ( p  m )d //

The sign of [ sr  s r ] can be expressed as:
1
2

1
2

Sign[ sr  s r ]  Sign [(d  w )(m   p ) ( g  m   p )  w //  ] .
//

//

(17)

__

Equation (17) suggests that sr  s r only if marginal monitoring costs are large relative to
penalties or penalties are relatively small compared to monitoring costs. In these cases, then
using the feature in (4) that the monitoring probability is monotonically decreasing in the
emissions standard, we can conclude that setting two standards may result in a higher
probability of monitoring than under a single regular emissions standard. sr  sr implies sr is
a stricter emissions standard than sr . As discussed earlier, a stricter emissions standard is more
difficult to achieve. There is a greater incentive to cheat at a stricter standard and therefore
increased enforcement is required to deter cheating. This result means that in setting two
standards the regulator may need to monitor more, but better environmental quality and a more
efficient outcome are achieved.
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1.6 Conclusions and Further Research

In this paper we have demonstrated how regulators may be able to exploit market
penalties and rewards for environmental performance to pursue more stringent environmental
regulations. Better environmental performance can be achieved using a combination of
conventional regulatory enforcement, financial market forces, and certification for overcompliance.
Since markets punish firms for non-compliance with environmental standards and
reward good performance, regulators can exploit this by setting stricter standards. In particular
certifying the achievement of over-compliance can lead to improved environmental
performance. Market enforcement allows the regulator to reduce monitoring effort while
simultaneously setting a stricter single emissions standard. Setting two emissions standards over-compliance and regular standards - is a more efficient policy option than a single
emissions standard, and it results in better environmental quality. However, setting two
emissions standards may require an increase in monitoring.
A possible area of further research in the work presented here relates to the implicit
assumption that the firm’s emissions are deterministic. An important question is what if the
firm’s emissions are random or consist of a random component? This randomness may affect
the probabilities of monitoring for the regulator and therefore may necessitate enforcement
strategies different from those adopted here.
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CHAPTER 2
THE EFFECTS OF MARKET STRUCTURE AND ENFORCEMENT COSTS ON AN
EMISSIONS TAX
2.1 Introduction

The well established theoretical prescription that efficiency of pollution control policy
requires an emissions tax equal to marginal damage (Pigouvian tax) be imposed on polluters is
based on competitive market assumptions. This equality between an emissions tax and
marginal damage does not hold in a non-competitive setup and when the firm’s emissions are
not perfectly observable. A good deal of analysis on emissions taxes often assume that
emissions are perfectly observable, monitored and that the tax is enforced at no cost to the
regulatory authority. However, emissions are typically unobservable, prompting the regulator
to enforce a tax on emissions to prevent or at least minimize cheating. Costly enforcement
ultimately distorts the optimal emissions tax away from marginal damage. The purpose of the
paper is to provide a theoretical analysis of the nature of an optimal emissions tax when firms’
emissions are not perfectly observable under both perfect competition and Cournot
competition, with and without free market entry. The focus on these two market structures is
important; the Cournot model provides a very simple link between perfect competition and
monopoly models. This crucial link lies in the firms’ ability to charge a price premium.
Several authors have explored the concept of the effects of market structure on the
Pigouvian tax on polluting firms. A pollution tax on a monopoly has two effects; it induces a
welfare gain from reduced pollution but there is a welfare loss due to reduced output (Oates
and Strassmann, 1984). Hence, the use of a Pigouvian tax involves a tradeoff between reduced
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emissions and reduced output. These two welfare effects imply that a tax on emissions could,
in fact, induce a net welfare loss.
When the firm responds to the tax by reducing output, particularly in an imperfectly
competitive market, the result is an optimal tax that falls short of marginal social damage. The
amount by which the optimal tax falls short of marginal damage depends on the price elasticity
of demand. But even when the market is imperfectly competitive and the firm responds to the
imposition of a tax by increasing abatement, the result is an optimal tax equal to marginal
social damage (Barnett, 1980; Lee, 1975). These results hold for a fixed number of firms in the
industry.
However, the size of the market affects the nature of an optimal emissions tax. The
number of entrants in free-entry equilibrium can either be excessive, insufficient, or optimal. In
the absence of the emissions tax the equilibrium number of firms is predicted to be greater than
the optimal number of firms (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). An emissions tax pushes the
equilibrium number of firms closer to the optimal number of firms, which has the effect of
increasing welfare. If this welfare effect is strong enough, the optimal emissions tax may
exceed marginal damage (Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1995).
The three welfare effects of the emissions tax cited above assume that emissions are
perfectly observable and the tax is costlessly enforced. Emissions taxes are usually based on
self-reported emissions by polluting firms. Often, there is an incentive for firms to under-report
their emissions and pay less taxes. A common attempt to prevent this problem is to enforce the
tax by establishing a mechanism to verify that firms are indeed reporting their true level of
emissions and hence are paying the right amount of tax. This monitoring activity is costly to
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the regulator, for example it takes manpower to set up and run audits. How this costly
monitoring affects the optimal tax is the subject matter of this piece of work.
The results indicate that when the number of firms in the industry is determined
exogenously, enforcing an emissions tax results in an optimal tax rate smaller than the social
marginal damage when there are no market imperfections. Enforcement pushes the optimal tax
lower than marginal damage because enforcing the tax adds to the social cost of pollution
control. The optimal tax reduces further when there are market imperfections. The implication
is that an optimal tax rate imposed on a fixed number of firms with some market power would
have to be adjusted downward to account for product market distortions and enforcement costs.
Enforcement costs have direct and indirect effects, with a countervailing influence on
the optimal tax when entry is endogenous. The direct effect of enforcement costs derives from
a higher marginal enforcement cost of inducing lower emissions, which pushes the optimal tax
lower. The indirect effect of enforcement costs results from the role of the tax as a deterrent to
entry. This indirect effect is positive and hence pushes the optimal tax up. The optimal tax is
greater than marginal damage if the indirect effect outweighs the direct effect of enforcement
costs. Alternatively, the optimal tax would be smaller than marginal damage if the indirect
effect falls short of the direct effect of enforcement costs.

2.2 The Basic Model: Emissions Tax, Enforcement and Individual Choices of Output and
Abatement

In this section we model the behavior of oligopolistic firms that compete in Cournot
fashion. Consider n identical Cournot firms. Each firm faces a tax t on their reported emissions,

ri . Firms always have the incentive to under-report their emissions and therefore pay lower
taxes; thus, the emissions tax must be enforced. A firm under-reports its emissions when self-

21

reported emissions are smaller than actual emissions, that is, ri  ei where ei is i’s emissions of
some uniformly mixed pollutant. The regulator establishes a mechanism to verify that firms are
indeed reporting their true level of emissions and hence are paying the right amount of tax.
Each firm faces a constant expected marginal penalty, denoted  , for violations. Requiring the
expected marginal penalty for violations to be constant is a special assumption intended to
simplify the analysis here. This assumption is also associated with our use of results found in
Stranlund et al (2009).
In monitoring and enforcing an emission standard the regulator incurs k (  ) in
enforcement costs, which are a function of the constant expected marginal penalty a firm faces
for any cheating. We assume that monitoring the firm’s emissions is without error; only firms
that cheat and are audited will be caught and punished. The enforcement costs, k (  ) , are
strictly increasing and strictly convex in the expected marginal penalty. That is, k / (  )  0 and

k // (  )  0 . The total expected penalties, expressed as  (ei  ri ) , imposed on the firm are
proportional to the size of violation. The emissions from firms cause some environmental
n

n

i 1

i 1

damage, d ( ei )  d ( E ) , where E   ei represents aggregate emissions. The damage

function is strictly increasing and strictly convex in E .
Let p  p(Q) be the price a firm receives per unit of output, where Q represents the
industry’s output. The price is a linear function of aggregate industry output only. A linear
demand function assumption allows us to make straightforward statements throughout the
paper, eliminating ambiguities in the results. Let qi   q j denote output for the rest of the
j i

industry except i. Also let c(qi , ei ) represents firm i ' s cost of output and abatement. The cost
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function is strictly increasing and strictly convex in output for a fixed level of emissions.
Similarly, the cost function is strictly decreasing and strictly convex in emissions for some
fixed output level. Furthermore, we make the common assumption that output and emissions
are complements, that is, cqe (qi , ei )  0 and the Hessian matrix of the cost function is positive
definite. The firm also incurs fixed costs of entry F . Fixed costs are important when we
examine the industry’s equilibrium and/or optimum number of firms as well as the social
welfare implications of firm i ' s choices.
The profit function for each firm is given by

 i  p(qi  qi )qi  c(qi , ei )  tri   (ei  ri ) .

(1)

Note that in the short run fixed costs are irrelevant in (1).
We now address the nature of the tax imposed on firms that are caught evading a part
of their emissions tax liabilities. To simplify the analysis we assume that the expected marginal
penalty for violation is set to induce full compliance. This assumption is supported by recent
work by Stranlund et al (2009) that suggests that inducing full compliance with a constant
expected marginal penalty will usually be optimal and that this constant expected penalty
should be set equal to the emissions tax. Simply, an emissions tax set equal to the expected
marginal penalty for violation faced by the firm will induce the firm to report only its true level
of emissions, ei  ri . In other words, ei  ri if t   .
With the regulator inducing full compliance, the profit function for each firm becomes:

 i  p(qi  qi )qi  c(qi , ei )  tei

(2)

Note that (2) does not imply that enforcing the tax has no effect on the firm’s profit function. It
only indicates that enforcing the tax eliminates any single firm’s incentive to cheat.
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2.3 Individual choice of Output and Abatement: Comparative Statics

Firms choose compliance strategies and select qi and ei to maximize profit. The firstorder conditions for (2) are:
p / (qi  q i )qi  p (qi  q i )  cq (qi , ei )  0;
 ce (qi , ei )  t  0.

(3)

For symmetric equilibrium, the first-order conditions can be written as
p / (nq )q  p (nq )  cq (q, e)  0;
ce (q, e)  t  0.

(4)

Equation (4) implicitly defines equilibrium output and emissions for each firm as a function of

n and t. These solutions can be expressed as:
q  q (n, t );
e  e(n, t ).

(5)

To examine how the tax and market size affect the profit-maximizing decisions of the
individual firm, substitute (5) into equations (4) to obtain
p / (nq (n, t ))q(n, t )  p( nq( n, t ))  cq (q (n, t ), e(n, t ))  0;
 ce (q (n, t ), e(n, t ))  t  0.

(6)

Differentiate (6) with respect to t:

p / / nqqt  (n  1) p / qt  cqq qt  cqe et  0;
ceq qt  cee et  1  0.
These can be written in matrix form as

 p / / nq  (n  1) p /  cqq  cqe   qt  0 

     .
 cee  et  1 
  ceq

(7)

The determinant of the Hessian matrix in (7) is [(n  1) p /  cqq ][cee ]  ceq2 , which we require
to be positive to satisfy the second order condition. Also, note that the linear demand function
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assumption implies that p //  0 . Hence, from here on we drop the terms involving p // .
Denote the determinant of the Hessian with S . The solutions for qt and et in (7) is given by
 cqe

qt 

1 0
S1

et 

/
1 (n  1) p  cqq
S  ceq

 cee

;

0
1

.

These solutions to can be expressed as follows:

qt (n, t )  cqe / S  0;

(8)

et (n, t )  (n  1) p /  cqq / S  0.

To see that S  0 , re-write it as  (n  1) p / cee  cqq cee  ceq2 . Note that cqe  0 and
cqq cee  ceq2  0 is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of the cost function which is positive

definite.

Since

p/  0 ,

cee  0 ,

and

 (n  1) p / cee  0 ,

clearly,

S  [(n  1) p /  cqq ][cee ]  ceq2  0 .

Equations (8) characterize the response of an individual firm to changes in the tax.
Firms’ profit-maximizing output and emissions are decreasing in the tax. The tax serves as a
deterrent to emissions through output decisions.
We now turn to the effect of market size on profit-maximizing output and emissions.
To examine the impact of the size of the market on equilibrium output and emissions
differentiate (6) with respect to n:
p / / q 2  p / q  p / / nqqn  (n  1) p / qn  cqq qn  cqe en  0;
ceq qn  cee en  0.
These can be re-written, setting p //  0 as
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(n  1) p /  cqq
cqe  q /   p / q 

 /   
.
c
c


0
e


  

ee 
 eq
Solve to obtain
qn 

/
1 pq
S  ceq

 cqe

en 

/
1 (n  1) p  cqq
S  ceq

0

;

 p/q
0

.

The solution to qn and en can be expressed as follows:
qn (n, t )  p / qcee / S  0;
en (n, t )   p / qceq / S  0.

(9)

Equations (9) characterize the response of an individual firm to an entrant in the market. A
firm’s profit-maximizing output and emissions are decreasing in the market size. The market
size factor reflects the ‘business stealing effect’ (Mankiw & Whinston, 1986). That is, output
per firm falls as the number of firms in the industry increases. Emissions per firm also fall, due
to a fall in production activity.

2.4 Optimal Tax with Exogenous Number of Firms

In this section we examine the nature of an emissions tax that is enforced when market
entry is blocked. Recall that the social planner sets   t . Thus, enforcement costs (k) as a
function of the tax can be written as k (t )  k (  ) , where k (t ) is strictly increasing and strictly
convex in the tax, k / (t )  0 and k // (t )  0 . The costs of enforcement we model here are
resources spent on monitoring a firm’s compliance. The social planner’s objective is to
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maximize the sum of consumer and producer surplus less environmental damage, fixed entry
and enforcement costs. That is,
Max W (t )  
t

nq ( n ,t )

0

p ( z )dz  nc(q(n, t ), e(n, t ))  d (ne(n, t ))  nk (t )  nF .

(10)

In (10) fixed entry costs have no effect on the nature of an optimal emissions tax when there is
no entry. The optimal tax rate is the solution to (10). To determine this optimal tax rate
differentiate (10) with respect to t:
p (nq )nqt  n[cq qt  ce et ]  nd / et  nk / (t )  0 .

The first-order condition implies that we can separate the total social cost of pollution control
for a given number of firms into pollution control effects, represented by (ce  d / )net  nk / (t )
and market imperfections (represented by ( p  cq )nqt ). A market imperfection has a balancing
effect on the cost of pollution control. Note that enforcement costs clearly increase the cost of
pollution control.
The optimal tax can be characterized from the first-order condition of (10), by
substituting ce  t from equation (4) and solving for t. That is,
p (nq )qt  cq qt  tet  d / et  k / (t )  0 .

implies
t *  d /  ( p  cq )

qt k / (t )

.
et
et

(11)

t * is the optimal tax for a given number of identical firms, d / is the marginal damage from
emissions, ( p  cq )  0 is the price premium for the oligopoly and k / (t ) represents marginal
enforcement costs. The price premium is weighted by the substitution between output and
emissions induced by a higher tax.
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In a perfectly competitive market where p  cq and there are no enforcement costs
associated with the tax the result in (11) is the Pigouvian tax. The optimal tax equals marginal
damage in a perfectly competitive market with a fixed number of industry participants if there
are no enforcement costs.
In an oligopolistic market where p  cq imperfect competition tends to make the
optimal tax less than marginal damage; this is the Oates and Strassmann (1984) result. This
implies that an optimal tax rate imposed on firms with some market power would have to be
adjusted downward to account for such market distortions.
Equation (11) shows that in addition to an adjustment factor to account for an
inefficiency associated with less than competitive output of an imperfectly competitive
industry, we have another adjustment factor to account for the costs of enforcing the tax. This
additional adjustment is represented by k / (t ) et . This is the per-firm marginal enforcement
cost of inducing lower emissions with a higher tax. A higher tax is required to reduce
emissions ( et  0 ). But a higher tax is associated with higher enforcement costs ( k / (t )  0 ). In
general, we have shown that firms will typically respond to the tax by choosing lower
emissions. Hence, the regulator chooses a higher tax to reduce emissions. However, a higher
tax increases the incentive to cheat. Cheating can only be deterred by increased enforcement
and this is costly.
Overall, for a given number of firms enforcing an emissions tax results in an optimal
tax rate smaller than the social marginal damage when there are no market imperfections. The
cost of enforcement constitutes the main contrast between the result here and the rest of the
literature on the impact of market structure on an emissions tax. The Oates and Strassmann
result indicates that market imperfections result in the optimal tax that is smaller than marginal
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damage. In (11), enforcement costs further push the optimal tax lower than marginal damage in
an imperfectly competitive industry. This is because enforcing the tax simply adds to the social
cost of pollution control.

2.5 Market Entry and the Optimal Tax

We now examine the nature of an optimal emissions tax with endogenous entry. Unlike
in the case of an optimal tax with a fixed number of firms, the equilibrium number of firms in
this case is endogenously determined. In choosing the tax the regulator accounts for the effect
on the tax of firms’ entry decisions. Specifically, in a three-stage game, the regulator chooses a
tax t and an enforcement strategy. The identical Cournot firms observe the tax and the
regulator’s enforcement strategy and then decide whether or not to enter the market. Firms that
enter the market choose their compliance strategies, output and abatement by maximizing
profit. A firm enters the market if and only if its profit covers the fixed cost of entry. The
solution to the game is found by backward induction.
The equilibrium number of firms for a given tax rate and fixed entry costs implied by
the zero-profit condition is defined by

 (n, t )  F  0 .

(12)

This implicitly defines the equilibrium number of firms as a function of the tax and fixed costs,

n( F , t ) . The optimal tax given endogenous entry is the solution to
nq

Max W (n( F , t ), t )   p( z )dz  nc(q, e)  d (ne)  nk (t )  nF ,
t

0

(13)

where n  n( F , t ) , q  q(n( F , t ), t ) , and e  (n( F , t ), t ) . The first order condition for (13) is:
p  nt q  n(qn nt  qt )   nt c .  ncq  (qn nt  qt )   nce  (en nt  et )  ;
d /  nt e  n(en nt  et )   (nt k  nk / )  nt F  0.
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(14)

Equation (14) determines the optimal tax when the number of firms is endogenous, and can be
re-written as
nt [ pq  c  F ]  nnt [ p  cq ]qn  n[ p  cq ]qt  nce (en nt  et )  d / Et  nt k  nk /  0 .

To determine the effect of endogenous number of firms and enforcement costs on the
optimal tax we first need to determine the signs of nt ( F , t ) and Et (n, t ) . nt ( F , t ) represents the
effect of the tax on entry while Et (n, t ) represents the effect of the tax on aggregate emissions.
To determine the sign of nt ( F , t ) , substitute the equilibrium number of firms, n( F , t ) , into
(12) to obtain

 (n( F , t ), t )  F  0

(15)

Differentiate (15) with respect to t and solve for nt ( F , t ) as follows:
 n (n( F , t ), t )nt ( F , t )   t (n( F , t ), t )  0 ;
nt ( F , t )    t (n( F , t ), t ) /  n (n( F , t ), t ) .

(16)

Hence, the sign of nt ( F , t ) depends on the sign of  t (n( F , t ), t ) and  n (n( F , t ), t ) .
 t (n( F , t ), t ) is the effect of the tax on the firm’s profit while  n (n( F , t ), t ) is the effect of
entry on the firm’s profit. Thus, the effect of the tax on the equilibrium number of firms
depends on how entry and the tax affect individual firms’ profit. First, we discuss the effect of
entry on the firm’s profit.
To determine of the effect of entry on the profit level for an individual firm, substitute
the equilibrium output and emissions levels in (5) into (2). That is,

(n, t )  p(nq(n, t )q(n, t )  c(q(n, t ), e(n, t ))  te(n, t )  0 .
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(17)

Differentiate (17) with respect to n to obtain

 n  p / (q  nqn )q  pqn  [ce  t ]en  cq qn .

From (4) ce  t ; thus, [ce  t ]en  0 . Also, using (4) we can express ( p  cq )qn as  p / qqn .
 n can then be re-written as p / (q  nqn )q  p / qqn . This can further be reduced to:

 n  p / q[q  (n  1)qn ] .

(18)

Recall that p /  0 and therefore p / q  0 . Hence,  n  0 if q  (n  1)qn  0 . To see that
q  (n  1)q n  0 ,

substitute

qn  ( p / qcee ) / S

from

equation

(9),

where

S  [(n  1) p /  cqq ][cee ]  ceq2 . Substituting qn into q  (n  1)qn yields q  (n  1) p / qcee / S

 [ Sq  (n  1) p / qcee ] / S . Sq alone can be expressed as  (n  1) p / qcee  q[cqq cee  ceq2 ] . The
whole

expression

[ Sq  (n  1) p / qcee ] / S

[(n  1) p / qcee  q[cqq cee  ceq2 ]  (n  1) p / qc] / S  [2 p / qcee  q[cqq cee  ceq2 ]] / S

becomes
.

This

is

positive because of the convexity of the cost function discussed earlier. Thus,
 n  p / q[q  (n  1)qn ]  0 .  n  0 says that profits are decreasing in the Nash equilibrium
number of firms. Note that this is in line with the business stealing effect discussed earlier.
That is, for a given price, each additional firm in the market results in smaller output per firm.
A decrease in the firm’s output lowers its profit level.
To determine the sign of  t (n( F , t ), t ) , differentiate (17) with respect to t to obtain
 t  p / nqqt  pqt  cq qt  ce et  tet  e  [ p / nq  p  cq ]qt  [ce  t ]et  e . We have shown in

(8) that qt  0 and that ce  t in equation (4). Thus, we can re-write  t (n( F , t ), t ) as
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 t (n( F , t ), t )  ( p / nq  p  cq )qt  e .

(19)

Taxes increase the cost of business, as seen in (2). Therefore, it is expected that an increase in
the tax should result in a lower profit for the firm, that is,  t (n( F , t ), t )  0 . In our model this
holds if p / nq  p  cq  0 , such that

 t (n( F , t ), t )  ( p / nq  p  cq )qt  e  0 , e  0 and

qt  0 as shown in (8).  t (n( F , t ), t )  0 simply implies that in addition to its role of restricting
emissions the tax also acts as an entry barrier.
Note that the requirement that  t (n( F , t ), t )  0 if p / nq  p  cq  0 may not hold in
all market structures, for example, perfect competition. In perfect competition there is no price
premium, that is, p  cq  0 and p / nq  0 . This suggests that (19) may in fact be ambiguous
or even positive. However, a positive outcome would be counterintuitive to the role of the tax
as production cost element.

We

have

discussed

the

conditions

under

which

 n (n( F , t ), t )  0

and

 t (n( F , t ), t )  0 . It follows that in (16) nt ( F , t )  0 . This means that the tax acts as an entry
barrier, increasing the tax restricts the equilibrium number of firm.

We now examine the effect of increasing the tax on aggregate emissions to determine
the sign of Et (n, t ) . Since we have assumed identical firms, aggregate emissions as a function
of the tax can be expressed as:
E (n( F , t ), t )  n( F , t )e(n( F , t ), t ) .
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(20)

Differentiate (20) with respect to t to obtain Et  nt e  n(en nt  et )  nt (e  nen )  net .
Assuming that the ultimate goal of the tax is to serve as a deterrent to emissions, we expect
aggregate emissions to be decreasing in the tax. We have already shown that nt  0 , et  0
and en  0 . Thus, Et  0 holds if e  nen  0 . Note that nt (e  nen ) represents the marginal
effect of the tax per-firm emissions. Hence, we expect that if emissions per firm are decreasing
in the tax, then aggregate emissions ultimately will be decreasing in the tax as well, that is,
Et  0 . If e  nen  0 then the effect of the tax on aggregate emissions may be ambiguous, a
general result that others have obtained, for example, Requate (2005). Or it is possible that the
tax results in higher aggregate emissions, a result counterintuitive to the goal of the tax. Such
an outcome can be envisioned for a policy that is focused solely on revenue generation
It is important to note that the tax has direct and indirect effects on aggregate emissions.
The direct impact of the tax on aggregate emissions obtains from the role of the tax as a
deterrent to individual firm’s emissions. The indirect effect of the tax on aggregate emissions,
represented by nt e reflects the role of the tax as an entry barrier. The tax results in a smaller
number of firms and this in turn results in lower aggregate emissions.
To obtain the optimal tax from (13) first re-write the first-order condition as
nt [ pq  c  F ]  nnt [ p  cq ]qn  n[ p  cq ]qt  nce (en nt  et )  d / Et  nt k  nk /  0 .

Using the zero profit condition, p(nq)q  c(q, e)  te  F  0 , substituting  ce  t from (3)
and re-arranging the terms we obtain the optimal tax given endogenous entry as
t d 
**

/

( p  cq )(qt  nt qn )
Et

33

nt k  nk / (t )

.
Et

(21)

In (21)

d / is the marginal damage associated with emissions. The term

( p  cq )qt represents the adjustment for market imperfections, weighted by the substitution
between individual firms’ output and aggregate emissions induced by a higher tax. The third
welfare effect of the tax under endogenous entry implied by Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas
(1995) is represented by ( p  cq )nt qn . Recall that one welfare effect of the tax is the reduction
in emissions, the second is the reduction in output and the third is that the tax limits the number
of firms in the industry. Hence, qt  nt qn represents the second and third welfare effects, acting
as a balance on one another. In the absence of enforcement costs, if the output effects exceed
the size effects of the tax then the results is an optimal emissions tax smaller that marginal
social damage. On the other hand, a size effect stronger than the output effect of the tax leads
to an optimal tax that exceeds the marginal social damage.
The solution above shows that enforcement costs have direct and indirect effects, with a
countervailing influence on the optimal tax when entry is endogenous. The direct effect of
enforcement costs on the optimal tax is represented by nk / (t ) / Et , the per-firm marginal
enforcement costs of inducing lower aggregate emissions through a higher tax.

Since

nk / (t ) / Et  0 the direct effect of enforcement costs is to push down the optimal tax. On the
other hand, the indirect effect of enforcement costs on the optimal tax, through the market size,
is represented by nt k / Et . This is the change in enforcement costs achieved by reducing the
market size and aggregate emissions through a higher tax. Since nt k / Et  0 the indirect effect
of enforcement costs is to push the tax up.
The optimal tax, assuming there are no market imperfections, is greater than marginal
damage if the indirect effect outweighs the direct effect of enforcement costs. The optimal tax
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would be smaller than marginal damage if the indirect effect falls short of the direct effect of
enforcement costs.

2.6 Conclusions and Further Research

We have examined the nature of an optimal emissions tax when firms’ emissions are
not perfectly observable under both perfect competition and Cournot competition with and
without free market entry. We have shown that for a given number of firms enforcing an
emissions tax results in an optimal tax rate smaller than the social marginal damage when there
are no market imperfections. The optimal tax reduces further when there are market
imperfections. The policy implication here is that an optimal tax rate imposed on firms with
some market power would have to be adjusted downward to account for such market
distortions and enforcement costs. Enforcement pushes the optimal tax lower from marginal
damage because enforcing the tax simply adds to the social cost of pollution control.
Enforcement costs have direct and indirect effects, with a countervailing influence on
the optimal tax when entry is endogenous. In this case, the direct effect of enforcement costs,
represented by the per-firm marginal enforcement costs of inducing lower aggregate emissions
through a higher tax on the optimal tax is negative and therefore pushes down the optimal tax.
On the other hand, the indirect effect of enforcement costs on the optimal tax is positive and
hence pushes the tax up. The optimal tax, assuming there are no market imperfections, is
greater than marginal damage if the indirect effect outweighs the direct effect of enforcement
costs and the optimal tax would be smaller than marginal damage if the indirect effect falls
short of the direct effect of enforcement costs.
It is well established that the equilibrium number of firms is greater than the optimal
number of firms even in the absence of an emissions tax (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). A tax
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has the tendency to reduce this gap between the equilibrium and optimal number of firms (Lee,
1999; Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas, 1995). As a result, it might be possible that a joint
determination of the optimal emissions tax and number of firms yield results different from the
ones in this paper. I leave this issue for future work.
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